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Responsibilization in contemporary Swedish crisis
management: expanding ‘bare life’ biopolitics through
exceptionalism and neoliberal governmentality
Carl Rådestada and Oscar Larssonb
aStraterno Institute, Sweden; bSwedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to investigate the changing relations
between individuals and public authorities within the Swedish
crisis management system from 1995 to 2017. After the end of
the Cold War, Sweden adopted a broader understanding of secur-
ity that utilizes alternative governance strategies beyond sover-
eign means and focuses upon domestic security and the
protection of vital systems. This has resulted in the emergence of
collaborative arrangements involving public and private actors
and as well as the extensive responsibilization of individuals. The
latter has taken place since emergency and exceptionalism persist
as vital concepts also in domestic security management. The pre-
sent discussion argues that these two concepts restrict possibilities
for democratizing security management and provides the means
for harnessing the inclusion of volunteers while not granting them
due voice in collaborative governance arrangements. However,
responsibilization strategies include ‘activation’ which in turn
may invoke critical agency and reflection as well as enable resis-








Policy makers have come to recognize the increased interdependence between vital
societal systems and the vulnerability of modern life during a period characterized by
neoliberal trends, fragmented societies, extensive outsourcing, and contractual support
from private actors. In the effort to control and protect these systems, the neoliberal
state has found new ways for governing beyond sovereign means and created new
forms of collaboration with private actors (Collier and Lakoff 2015, 21; Larsson 2015a).
There is, thus, a broad consensus today that contemporary crisis management requires
collaborative efforts across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries (’t Hart and
Sundelius 2013, 445; Larsson 2017, 312).
In addition, neoliberal governance has implemented strategies that encourage indi-
viduals to take responsibility for their own security to enhance societal security and
resolve crisis situations (Rådestad 2017; Collier and Lakoff 2008; Dillon 2007). Both
public–private collaboration and responsibilization divert attention from an
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examination of how the concepts of emergency and exceptionalism continue to under-
lie the rationality of security. Our position is that exceptionalism continues to play a
decisive role in this regard in spite of the view that bureaucratization, routinization,
manualization, and the influence of crisis and risk management upon domestic security
would seem to have removed exceptionalism from the equation (Buzan, Waever, and
Jaap 1998, 27; Aradua and Rens 2009). Briefly stated, exceptionalism coupled with
neoliberal governmentality provides the grounds for modern biopolitical governance,
which help us understand why crisis management remains out of bounds for demo-
cratic procedures, meaningful individual participation and opposition.
Our discussion resides upon a study of the changes that have taken place in Sweden
since 1995 in the crisis management system. While it may not be possible, strictly
speaking, to generalize our results on the empirical level because of our focus on this
particular issue, our theoretical and critical arguments together with our findings
provide insights beyond the given object of study. The political reorganization of
emergency preparedness and security that began in the 1990s has brought about a
substantial change from a military outlook at the national level to a decentralized and
networked form of domestic security management. In this respect, Sweden comprises
an excellent example for exploring the dynamics and limitations of increased individual
participation in the political field of security.
Our aim is to answer the following two research questions upon the basis of the
theoretical background indicated above, the case study we conducted, and our norma-
tive concern to problematize the current practices:
(1) How has the role of individuals changed within the Swedish crisis management
system between 1995 and 2017?
(2) Is it possible to breach the continuation of exceptionalism and the anti-politics of
security via imminent resistance and critical agency?
The first question, which is empirical in nature, is addressed through a longitudinal case
study of the development of the Swedish crisis management system in Sweden that
explicitly focuses on how the roles of individuals are portrayed. The second question,
which has a normative foundation and is theoretical in character, provides the basis for a
significant critique of the continued presence of exceptionalism in domestic security
management and to the possibility that activation strategies alsomay induce critical agency.
The article is structured as follows. The immediately following section presents in
greater detail the normative and theoretical underpinnings of the discussion. We first
note that the crucial roles still played by uncertainty and fear in shaping domestic
security management hinder both democratic reform of the sector as well as meaningful
individual participation. We then examine a more normative approach entailing
accounts of resistance and critical agency that possesses a potential to question the
neoliberal strategy of responsibilization. The next section specifies methodological
considerations involving the utilization of a post-structural policy analysis in which
ideas and subjectivities play crucial roles. The article then addresses the case study in
question, analyzing the development of the Swedish domestic security management
system. The analysis finds that, despite extensive calls for collaboration and responsi-
bilization, individual participation is limited to supplementary functions, primarily
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being regarded as a resource for unburdening the public administration when needed.
We discuss these findings in relation to theoretical accounts of resistance and ‘critical
agency’. Since resistance and critical agency make the claim that all forms of existences
are political, we can deploy these in our problematization of exceptionalism and ‘bare
life’ conception still underlying contemporary crisis management.
Exceptionalism, fear, and the democratic paradox
Crises and emergencies are by definition unexpected, exceptional, and often demand
prompt resolution outside of existing regulations and legal frameworks. This is perhaps
most explicitly captured in Carl Schmitt’s discussion of how liberal constitutionalism
has been weakened by the ‘politics’ of exception. Schmitt argues that the declaration of
a security incident, which triggers an exception to the accepted rules and procedures,
enables us to identify who in fact holds sovereign power. He also states that
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may
take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and
how it is to be eliminated (Schmitt 2005, 7).
Williams maintains that such situations neither result simply from an exercise of the
authority to declare a security incident nor as a diversion from normal procedures, but
are rather rooted in a sense of fear and danger that legitimizes the implementation of
solutions that violate a given political constitution (Williams 2011, 218). It is also
significant that exceptionalism often leads to the removal of critical voices, even when
this ‘rings liberal alarm bells’ (Johns 2005). For such reasons, scholars have argued that
domestic crisis and security management should create a more routine-based approach
involving bureaucratic management such that there would be a reduced reliance upon
exceptions and states of emergency (Buzan, Waever, and Jaap 1998, 27; Aradua and
Rens 2009). The dispersion of power through collaborative governance, and an insis-
tence upon individual responsibility and contributions to the crisis management sys-
tem, would potentially contradict the logic of hierarchical sovereign power and top-
down executive management that has come to characterize political emergencies
(Honig 2009, 1). As we shall see in our case study, neoliberal governmentality and
responsibilization align perfectly well with a continuation of the exceptionalism that
obstructs the democratization of modern crisis management.
To the extent that fear and a sense of danger remain decisive factors in domestic and
international security management, the possibility of utilizing exceptionalism and
emergency measures, including a temporary suspension of at least particular elements
of democratic governance such as transparency, accountability and basic civil and
political rights, is likely to persist.
Huysmans points out in this regard that
[O]ne of the key characteristics of the jargon of exception is its suppression of the political
renditions of the societal. In doing so, it eliminates one of the constituting categories of
modern democratic politics, hence producing an impoverished and ultimately illusory
understanding of the political contestation and domination (Huysmans 2008, 165).
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He further argues that exceptionalism ‘erases the societal as a realm of multi-faceted,
historically structured political mediations and mobilizations’ because of the specific
way in which it frames political problems and solutions (Huysmans 2008, 180), thereby
comprising a moment in which executive powers enjoy supremacy over democratic
institutions and principles. This conflict between the rule of law and arbitrary executive
government generates a logic that continues to play a pivotal role in domestic security
politics (Dillon 2007; Bjorneskov and Voigt 2017).
Foucault demonstrated that extensive caring for the population viewed as a (biolo-
gical) resource of the state exists even in the most advanced liberal societies with
lengthy catalogs of explicit rights (Foucault 2008). It is significant, however, that the
concept of biopower or biopolitics does not contradict the exercise of sovereign power,
but rather complements it. Moreover, biopolitics cancels out the political dimensions of
societal existence in that it is concerned with the basic survival of human beings. This
point is illustrated by Agamben, who proposes the ‘bare life’ terminology that addresses
the individual as a ‘living animal (only) with the additional capacity for political
existence’ (Agamben 1998, 7).
But while the democratic and political aspects of public life may be temporarily
suspended in exceptional circumstances, Honig makes the case that the basic
resources of democratic citizenship, including the language of rights, the rule of
law, and faith in progress, do not necessarily provide the tools needed to question
the forms of submission associated with calls for states of emergency. She never-
theless proclaims that ‘opportunities, invitations and solicitations to democratic
orientation, action and renewal’ can in fact be identified ‘even in the context of
emergency’ (Honig 2009, xv). The idea of a ‘democratization’ of emergencies and
exceptions seems hastily eager to re-establish liberal institutions without taking the
insights provided by Schmitt and Huysmans truly serious. Our study reveals the
continuation of exceptionalism in contemporary crisis management, which remains
biopolitical at its core, limiting individual participation to ‘bare life’ contributions,
regardless of its inclusive language concerning the importance of voluntary and
collaborative efforts. Even if we are more hesitant toward a democratization of crisis
management, we still think it is important to consider how responsibilization acts
on individuals and urge them to activate a specific mindset – to critically think in
terms of potential threats and crises and how to cope in such situations. Such
activation potentially also brings to life various forms of resistance through critical
agency. In that sense, we may indeed consider a politicization rather than democra-
tization of exceptions in that resistance and struggles of meaning-making and re-
distribution of responsibility comes into play (Jong and Dückers, 2018, 97).
Foucault was eager to point out that the mechanisms and workings of power
upon the bodies and minds of those who are subjects to power relations was not
fully grasped by the rationalities and hegemonic strategies (Foucault 1990, 97),
arguing that:
It is the moving substrate of force relations (the substance upon which power as a
living organism feeds –Authors) which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender
states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable (Foucault 1990, 93).
Power and freedom are in fact mutually constitutive and naturally limits the claim of
legitimate exercise of state power which further moves us away from the normative
CRITICAL POLICY STUDIES 89
language of a shift toward democracy (Patton 2010). Still, even if legitimacy of govern-
ance is unreachable through this understanding of power, there is still room for
resistance:
At the heart of power relations and a permeant condition of their existence, there is
an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of
freedom, then there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible
flight (Foucault 1982, 790)
The notion of critical agency is the core subject of such resistance. This subject holds
the capacity for self-reflection and the capacity to take distance from what is considered
to be domination, conformism, and compliance. ‘Critical agency is possible because the
subject can place him/herself outside the objectification produced by “domination” and
can imagine alternatives’ (Rebughini 2018, 4).
We will now continue to explore how this normative discussion is pertinent to the
changing nature of crisis and security management.
The place of individuals within the emerging political field of domestic
security
Early critics of the field of traditional security studies maintained that it resided upon a
narrow definition of security that was primarily concerned with national interests, the
security of the state, and military capability, but displayed little understanding of the
concept and dynamics of security as such (Baldwin 1997, 9). Buzan, Waever, and De
Wilde consequently argued that it was necessary to broaden the concept of security to
incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental threats. In addition, each of
these threats could be analyzed on the three levels of the international system, the state,
and the individual, with the latter being viewed as the main referent of security, while
the state nevertheless continued to be defined as the principal instrument for attaining
security by virtue of its capacity, agency, and power (Buzan, Waever, and Jaap 1998, 21f,
52). Also noteworthy is the fact that combining a broader understanding of security
with a nominalist theory of securitization casts light upon the processes in which
objects of security are constituted by means of speech-acts and audience acceptance
(Guzzini 2011; Balzacq 2010).
While the absence of external military threats after the end of the Cold War
motivated many western states to redirect their focus toward domestic security issues,
the attacks of 11 September 2001, in the USA, produced a major surge in interest
concerning security policy that led to the development of ‘integrated approaches to
studying risk, crisis, and emergency management’ (’t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 445).
Security is thus increasingly associated with the safeguarding of critical functions in
society as well as the security of individuals (Collier and Lakoff 2015), although this
more domestically focused understanding of security is also associated with a conflation
of security and risk management (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Rens 2008, 148). The
resulting increased interdependencies between risk, vital societal systems, and the
vulnerability of modern life have given rise to complex collaborative arrangements
involving both public and private actors to manage and mitigate domestic crises and
security challenges (Collier and Lakoff 2015). A broad consensus has emerged that
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contemporary crisis management demands collaborative efforts across organizational
and jurisdictional boundaries (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010).
Such developments have strongly affected relationships between the state and its
citizens. For instance, social constructions regarding how individuals behave in a crisis
are now often based upon the assumption that people panic and desperately need the
support of public authorities. This has had a great impact upon the formation of crisis
management policies, including how information and responsibilities are distributed.
One common assumption is that crisis situations are typically accompanied by out-
breaks of lawlessness and social chaos due to the irrational behavior of helpless
individuals, who almost immediately return to a Hobbesian state of nature (Tierney,
Bevc, and Kuligowski 2006).
In general, security experts tend to believe that individuals are ‘misinformed, badly
educated and highly emotional’ (Sjöberg 1999, 5), and this rather paternalistic approach
on the part of government agencies and experts obviously shapes the strategies adopted
for managing crises and communicating relevant information. Even though most efforts
at crisis communication reflect an awareness of the need to provide the public with
accurate information, actual communication is typically informed by unfounded pre-
sumptions regarding the supposed limited ability of individuals to act and behave in
specific ways (Wester 2011, 208). Such foundational disbelief concerning individual
abilities and behavior undermines the level of trust between authorities and the public.
This is a significant concern insofar as a sense of vulnerability, access to recourse, and
public trust in the effectiveness of security systems is of great relevance for a successful
response both during and after a crisis (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005, 208).
However, despite the low level of trust on the part of authorities in the abilities of
individuals to either help themselves or contribute to overall crisis management system –
or perhaps because of it – neoliberal governmentality strategies of awareness creation and
responsibilization have emerged. It is fruitful in this regard to take into consideration,
upon the basis of Foucault’s notion of governmentality and the insights provided by
governmentality studies, how governance can be conducted by means of autonomy rather
than legal regulation and coercion (Foucault 2008). The strategy of responsibilization, or
the transfer of responsibility from governments to individuals and other actors, reflects an
effort to increase the awareness of individual actors so that they will undertake the
preparations needed to avoid unnecessary risks and dangers (Garland 2001).
The supposedly vulnerable public is often viewed as both complacent and a serious
threat in post-disaster contexts, and public authorities regard a heightened level of
preparedness as a means to increase their own level of social control and locate
individuals within a primarily military and hierarchical approach to crisis management.
Nevertheless, public reflections reveal a significant potential for self-organization and
altruistic behavior (Baker and Ludwig 2016, 1), and experiences from past disasters
have showcased the benefits of engaging local communities in disaster risk reduction
and response. There is also an increasing emphasis upon pro-active engagement with
society by the authorities regarding domestic security management, along with a
growing awareness that the key to security programs and social resilience involves the
‘coping capacities of citizens’, that is, their ability to respond and adapt to crises and
security threats (Lentzos and Rose 2009; Collier and Lakoff 2008; Chandler 2013, 210).
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While such analyses have made important contributions to security studies, we must
recognize that neoliberal strategies of responsibilization produce new forms of resis-
tance and ‘counter-conducts’ (Death 2016), and potentially also ‘emancipatory subjec-
tivities’ (Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin 2015). Notwithstanding the importance of
revealing the neoliberal tendencies in security management, it is also necessary to take
into consideration how individuals, once activated and made responsible, can through
their critical agency turn such strategies on their heads. Stated otherwise, activated
citizens are not necessarily silent recipients of services, but may also become activists
and create pockets of resistance and shift the burden of responsibility away from
themselves during and after emergency situations. The paradox is that security and
crisis management permanently contains a biopolitical concerns for the well-being of
the population, whereas the rationality and strategies for its implementation may shift
between various overarching governmentalities.
Acknowledging the fact that individuals may possess both important local knowledge
and significant capabilities implies that administrative authorities should refrain from
assuming full control in emergency events and instead assist individual involvement
and action (Enander 2011, 166f; Scott et al. 2015). Research has indicated, however, that
people’s willingness to act during crises is not matched by the system’s capacity to
utilize it (Fernandez, Barbera, and Johan 2006, 62). Indeed, while ordinary citizens
often converge upon disaster sites to be of assistance, which can be easily facilitated
through social media platforms (Schmidt et al. 2017, 1), the nature of conventional
approaches to emergency planning frequently results in reluctance on the part of
authorities to promote volunteer activities. Public authorities typically adopt a com-
mand and control approach, based upon ‘clearly defined objectives, a division of labor,
a formal structure, and a set of policies and procedures,’ that is not conducive to
incorporating individual initiatives (Skar, Sydnes, and Sydnes 2016, 56). Ullberg and
Warner thus argue that
Despite a discourse promoting the inclusion of people in planning for preparedness and
reducing risk, community members are seldom truly empowered to bear this responsi-
bility, nor are existing local social capital and cultural knowledge always considered
legitimate and accepted by authorities (Ullberg and Warner 2016).
Crisis management today usually involves little feedback from local communities, even
though people who are affected by a disaster or crisis possess the knowledge and
capabilities needed to handle difficult situations (Bondesson 2017, 55–56). There is
also great potential in the way individuals acquire experience and are able to evaluate
operative aspects of emergency management (Sousa and Gómez 2012). All this serves to
indicate that responsibilization and an increased awareness of security can in fact enable
individuals to participate during and after emergencies and consequently ‘politicize’ the
exception by virtue of their presence, knowledge, and alternative views that comes to
live through critical agency. The role of the state in this type of configuration would be
to support people’s ability to act both individually and collectively, which demands that
individuals be viewed as ends in themselves with the capacity to act and function as
agents, not merely as typical security objects. This would support critical agency in a
way that could transcend the ‘bare life’ biopolitical elements that now mark states of
emergency.
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Analyzing policy changes in respect to how subjects are represented
The poststructuralist type of policy analysis that we utilize in the present discussion
seeks to deconstruct policy and examine the ideas and presumptions that underlie
specific reforms and programs. Ideas matter a great deal in respect to policy
insofar as
[I]deas shape how political actors understand and act on problems, providing the objec-
tives served by their strategic behavior. Furthermore, by shaping values and preferences,
ideas provide political actors with interpretive frameworks that make them see certain
information as more important than other information (Larsson 2015b, 175).
The main purpose of employing this type of policy analysis is to gain an under-
standing of the contingent and political foundations of policies that do not necessa-
rily rely upon sovereign and juridical instruments of control and punishment, but
rather upon discourses, attitudes, and prescriptions (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 108).
To examine how relationships between the state and the citizens have been altered in
the Swedish case, we focus on the element of subjectivization in policy.
Subjectivization, which prescribes certain characteristics and qualities that indivi-
duals are held to possess (Schneider and Ingram 1993), may be understood as a
process that comprises how subjects are created (Chandler 2013), whereby a ‘conduct
of conduct’ is established (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 71). This focus permits us to
investigate the beliefs and assumptions that underlie recent shifts in domestic
security management, thus making possible a critical reflection upon how ‘policies
constantly produce or constitute problems, subjects, objects and places in specific
contexts’ (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 108).
It is important to note that the present study is intended to reveal how governing
agencies wish to see individuals, and how such ideal images provide the basis of their
strategies for governing and resolving problems. Stated otherwise, this study seeks to
explore the specific ways in which individuals are portrayed in core policy documents.
The basic and underlying tenant is that the subjectivizations of individuals shape the
ways in which individuals are approached and managed within domestic security
management.
The empirical analysis traces the development of the crisis and security management
system in Sweden between 1995 and 2017. The main sources we utilize are Swedish
Government official reports; government bills, laws, and propositions; and official
documents from various responsible governmental agencies, primarily the Swedish
Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), established in 2009. The aims of the MSB are to
oversee domestic crisis and security management and prioritize the provisioning of
comprehensive support before, during, and after incidents. Since the MSB has weak
operational capabilities, it focuses upon coordinating other actors and evaluating
operations (Larsson 2015a, 117).
The documents examined include annual reports, responses to government bills, and
independent studies conducted by the MSB and other agencies. We also conducted 10
semi-structured interviews that complement the qualitative text analysis. Our respon-
dents, who present influential and expert views in the documents indicated, were
selected in light of their experience working with relevant policy issues at the MSB.
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The Swedish case: changes overtime in responsibilities
A broadening of the concept of security within the Swedish context that took place
during the 1990s eventually diminished the role of the state as a security provider. The
1995 public report A More Secure Society argued that since the likelihood of military
threats toward Sweden had substantially diminished, it should be possible to adopt a
view of security more comprehensive than a military outlook, with a heightened focus
on domestic security and peacetime social crises (SOU 1995:19, 17–21). The subsequent
government bill, Total Defense in Renewal, further encouraged a broader approach to
security, implying that non-military threats should receive a more prominent position
within total defense planning. The need to involve both civil public authorities and
private actors during crises situations was also emphasized (Prop 1995/96:11, 11–12).
This new focus on domestic security and non-military threats led to a substantial
reorganization within the public administration, with one of the main new orientations
being to provide coordination in the now dispersed field of security where many vital
systems stood in need of protection. The plethora of emergency provisions, laws, and
regulations that previously governed the functioning of the Swedish state apparatus
during a state of heightened military preparedness was now replaced with three
organizational principles for coping with domestic crisis:
(1) The principle of responsibility – whoever is responsible for operations under
normal conditions should have equivalent responsibility during crisis situations.
(2) The principle of similarity – the organization of any function in crisis situations
should remain as similar as possible to its normal status.
(3) The principle of subsidiarity – crisis and security challenges should be managed
at the lowest possible level.
The new organizational structure that these principles made possible was intended to
adapt the Swedish context to new types of threats to security and redirect attention
away from total defense planning to managing local crisis situations and exceptional
circumstances (SOU 2001:41, 15–30).
Security in a New Time (SOU 2001:41) was the first public report that addressed the
new relationship between the state and individuals regarding domestic security manage-
ment, but it put forward no principles for how to define and manage it. The report was
in fact rather negative concerning the possibility of collaborative efforts, maintaining
that corporations, organizations, and individuals both lacked the knowledge needed to
prepare for the long-term consequences of crises, and were apparently unwilling to
contribute to a collaborative crisis management system (SOU 2001:41, 74, 77). It
consequently emphasized that combatting the decline in trust which individuals had
in public authorities in this regard demanded the provision of the necessary informa-
tion (SOU 2001:41, 55–58). A government bill from the same year, Society’s Safety and
Preparedness (Prop 2001/02:158), put forward the idea that the ability of individuals to
act can influence the ability of rescue services to respond. A second government bill,
Voluntary Defense Activities within Total Defense (Prop 2001/02:159), addressed the
importance of individuals in respect to total defense capabilities in terms of citizen
engagement (Prop 2001/02:159, 9). These two bills articulated the view that individuals
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should be primarily responsible for preparations for relatively minor incidents, but they
also clearly indicated that the public authorities would need to intervene during security
crises and large-scale events as soon as individuals could no longer manage the
situation (Crismart 2014, 18).
The 2006 Swedish Defense Committee report A Strategy for the Security of Sweden
(Ds 2006:1) argued that a degree of re-centralized control on the national level was
necessary to ensure efficient crisis response (Ds 2006:1, 25f). This report in large part
addressed recent natural disasters, including the 2004 East Asian tsunami, in which
there were many Swedish casualties, and the destructive 2005 Cyclone Gudrun in
Sweden. Evaluations of these incidents argued that individuals have a responsibility to
take preventive measures and protect their own lives and property. However, the
security strategy articulated in the government bill Coordination during Crisis – For a
Safer Society (Prop 2005/06:133) focused mainly on societal safety and functions, stating
that most such events exceed the limits of individual responsibility because the general
public lack the ability and knowledge needed to act without the assistance of the
authorities (Prop 2005/06:133, 45).
The government argued that the actual responsibilities of both authorities and
individuals needed to be further clarified to avoid continued individual reliance upon
public authorities in times of crisis, which could damage trust if the authorities were
unable to meet excessive demands (Prop 2007/08:92, 8, 42). Individuals should thus
bear primary responsibility for their own safety, and public authorities should assist
them only when absolutely necessary (Prop 2007/08:92, 49). This was made explicit in a
government bill the following year, Society’s Emergency Preparedness – Strengthened
Coordination for Increased Security, which stated that
[I]ndividuals bear the responsibility for their own safety and preparedness in that society
may have to prioritize its resources and efforts when severe disturbances occur (SOU 2009/
10:124, 8f).
The 2014 Law on Explosives Precursors and Report of Crisis Preparedness Development
(Prop 2013/14:144) further expanded the role individuals should play within the crisis
management system. Increased individual awareness, preparedness, and the ability to
endure in times of crisis were clearly presented as contributing to the resilience and
robustness of society as a whole (Prop 2013/14:144, 13) since the responsibility to be
prepared not only involves individual self-interest, but also serves the entire population.
This bill advanced the notion that while individuals bear primary responsibility for
protecting their own lives and property, doing so contributes to societal security and
unburdens the crisis management system. Only when individuals could no longer
provide for their own security would public authorities have the responsibility to
become engaged (Prop 2013/14:144, 30).
This transformation of the political structures and prerequisites concerning crisis
management, emergency preparedness, and the role of individuals concerning their
responsibility and capacity for ensuring public security took place in a relatively stable
geopolitical environment after the end of the Cold War. More recent international and
geopolitical events, such as perceived Russian aggression toward Ukraine, have set in
motion a return to a militaristic focus in crisis and security management. The latter also
reflects the increased level of threat involving terrorist actions in Europe in general and
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Sweden in particular, which, along with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns,
has shifted the focus from domestic crisis situations to external and international
threats to security (Government Decision 2015, 3–4; Crismart 2017, 23).
Consequently, the Government in 2015 commissioned the MSB and the Swedish
armed forces with developing a comprehensive proposal for total defense
(Government Decision 2015, 1), with the MSB being placed in charge of planning
regarding a civilian defense structure that would be in place by 2020. This includes an
explicit focus on the roles of individuals in crisis and security management (MSB
2016b, 2f).
This ongoing project is addressed in the analysis below, where we further explore the
relationship between the state and individuals and illustrates the contrast between ‘bare
life’ biopolitics and (absence of) critical agency.
The individual as a silent resource
The discussion above has illustrated the general development of the Swedish crisis
management system after 1995. The overall problem is presented in terms of societal
resilience, with increased risk awareness and improved societal capabilities being
important for withstanding and managing crises. While the biological human being is
envisioned as the primary focal point, which is to say that the protection of individuals
and the health and security of the population is prioritized, there is also a substantial
change in the overall discourse regarding individuals and security. Increased responsi-
bility was placed upon individuals when they were identified as security objects within
the new security environment in the mid-1990s since they were to provide for their own
security, but this was also regarded as providing substantial relief to public authorities
and contributing to the robustness of society as a whole.
However, while individuals were thus transformed from being a relative liability to a
strong but silent force in domestic security management, allowance was made neither
for channels of reciprocity between the state and individuals, nor for procedures to
promote the influence of individuals either during or after a crisis. In addition, the need
to ensure that individuals possess the capabilities necessary to answer for their own
safety created a separation between capable (responsible) and incapable (non-
responsible) individuals. Moreover, the main point with encouraging individual respon-
sibility was in fact to supplement the limited state resources at the disposal of the public
authorities. This was highlighted in a government bill from 2014 which stated that
Experiences show that measures at this time are not adequate for immediately reaching
everyone in need. It is therefore important that individuals have the ability to handle their
own security during the beginning of a crisis (Prop 2013/14:144, 17).
A national campaign stressed the need for each household to prepare a 72-hour survival
kit to increase individual awareness and the ability to survive a crisis. The MSB also
organized Preparation Week in 2017, which will most likely become an annual national
campaign, to raise awareness of the vulnerability of modern society and the importance
of individual responsibility (MSB 2017a; Crismart 2015, 11). However, one of our
respondents observed that the purpose of the MSB’s recommendations was in fact to
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make people understand that they will not receive help straight away, and therefore have to
plan for and manage the initial stages of a crisis by themselves (Respondant No. 2).
Not many people were speaking of individual preparedness (prepping) to any great
extent when the conceptual development of civil defense began in 2013–2014 since
the general view was that it was too much to expect individuals to prepare for
possible crises and be responsible for their own security (Respondant No. 1).
There was also unease within the MSB concerning the new ways of thinking
about civil defense and emergency preparedness that led to a situation in which
new crisis and security management needs were formulated using old concepts and
visions, such as prepping (Respondant No. 1). The reality in Sweden today is that
of an ongoing process of responsibilization in which public authorities devote
substantial time and resources to raising individual awareness, even as they make
it clear that public funds and efforts cannot and should not be used to assist
capable individuals.
Thinking of crisis management in economic terms
The MSB and the Swedish civil crisis management structure has the deeply rooted goal
of pursuing economic efficiency and prioritizing what is deemed most valuable to
protect. A recent armed forces report explicitly states that the aim is to identify not
only ‘who will act, but also the resources that will be used in a constant assessment of
what is worth protecting’ (Försvarsmakten 2016, 6). The same report makes a number
of references to the costs associated with support efforts, the difficulty with prioritizing
necessary tasks because of a lack of resources sufficient for meeting all the needs of
society, and the uncertainties of future crisis scenarios (Försvarsmakten 2016, 10f). One
of the most deep-seated assumptions regarding crisis management strategies and the
roles of individuals is the notion that ‘we cannot reach everyone in the initial stages of
an emergency/crisis’ (Prop 2013/14:144, 30), and that individuals should bear the
primary responsibility for protecting their own lives and property. One respondent
remarked in this regard that the ‘individual is viewed as a means for unburdening the
system’ (Respondant No. 1), while another described the role of the public authorities
as ‘complementary to individual responsibility during crises’ (Respondant No. 3).
The depiction of public authorities as having only limited resources available for
emergency and crisis management plays a key role in the policy of responsibilization
since one aim of the latter is that individuals cope with security challenges on their own,
with the responsibility of public authorities being limited to leadership, coordination,
and collaboration with civil society NGOs (Respondant No. 3).
But even though the MSB’s responsibility is to support and coordinate individual
efforts, it has absorbed many neoliberal ideas that are apparently at odds with the task
of coordination. As one employee stated in respect to the new national emergency
communication system, which was financed by subscription fees,
the MSB’s key task is to sell the concept of crisis management to other public agencies and
organizations and convince them of its benefits (Respondant No. 4).
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The limited involvement of volunteers in crisis management
At the same time that public authorities want capable individuals to assume a
greater responsibility for their own security, thereby ‘unburdening’ the crisis man-
agement system, substantial numbers of both volunteers and NGOs seek to con-
tribute in more active ways during crisis events. Nevertheless, even those policy
documents that address the importance of increased individual responsibility are
often lukewarm toward utilizing the knowledge and resources that volunteers bring
to the table. For example, the report evaluating the response to the 2014
Västmanland forest fire stated that all actors must live up to their responsibilities
both before and during a crisis in accordance with the legal framework, emphasizing
the need for familiarity with society’s emergency preparedness so that their ‘ability
to handle a crisis is not dependent upon how the authorities are organized or on the
knowledge of private individuals’ (MSB 2016a, 6). This phrasing clearly indicates
that society’s crisis management organization should not rely upon individuals. The
issue in this regard is not only that the regulations governing the involvement of
multiple actors in emergency preparedness and crisis management explicitly focus
on the public sector (MSB 2016a, 6), but that individuals are not regarded as
comprising a reliable force capable of making significant contributions to resolving
domestic security situations.
There is obviously a potential danger in relying upon volunteers insofar as their lack
of formal responsibility may lead to asymmetrical and uncertain responses in emer-
gency situations, and this is obviously reflected in the public regulations (MSB 2016a,
63). Individual volunteer activities are thus not included in the field-guide that appar-
ently provides instructions for how public authorities are to coordinate with civil
society organizations in periods of crisis (MSB 2016d).
Another example in this regard is a 2017 MSB report that provides an overall
evaluation of the contributions of relevant actors during 2016 crisis management
operations. Although the activities of individuals during such events were presented
as supplementary to the efforts of public authorities, who could utilize them as
necessary, the report revealed that the authorities were reluctant to include volunteers
in their operations (MSB 2017b, 17). Moreover, even though the MSB had recently
participated in an international effort to develop a new ISO-standard concerning the
involvement of spontaneous volunteers during crises, such involvement was identified
as one of the greatest future challenges facing policymakers (MSB 2015). One respon-
dent in fact remarked during an interview that identifying structures, arenas, and
management practices that could facilitate such engagement would require revision of
the MSB system (Respondant No. 3).
We have thus found little support in our investigation for the existence of a
systematic approach to the inclusion of individuals and volunteers that in any
meaningful way consider a critical capacity or what might be termed meaningful
and respectful participation. Rather, individuals and volunteers are acted upon as
silent resources that should complement public authorities. This is paradoxical in
light of the extensive efforts taken to raise awareness and encourage individuals to
prepare for and withstand crises and unburden the public authorities.
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Merging neoliberalism and exceptionalism through biopolitics
Proposed policy guidelines for developing emergency preparedness structures in
Sweden describe the ability of individuals to assume responsibility and act on their
own as of the utmost importance for society’s security (Prop 2013/14:144). The
document in question states that openness, participation, and dialog between
individuals, administrative authorities, and other actors should be encouraged,
and it emphasizes the need for individuals, based upon their specific situation,
to ensure their own security in respect to emergency preparedness. The latter
centers on individual risk awareness, responsibility, will, and the ability to manage
one’s own security, with information campaigns having been undertaken concern-
ing how individuals can become more involved in crisis management (Prop 2013/
14:144, 14, 25f).
However, these campaigns have constructed the issue in such a way that they
focus on spreading knowledge, not creating interest in or commitment to security.
When this is coupled with the issues of prioritization and restricted resources
during emergencies, questions inevitably arise regarding how public authorities
will be able to include individuals in crisis management structures. Not only has
social trust and cooperation been undermined by individuals being encouraged to
take care of themselves and not expect assistance from the authorities, the evident
unwillingness of public authorities to ensure the involvement of volunteers in crisis
response further diminishes any possibility of meaningful participation and illus-
trates the continuation of exceptionalism and ‘bare life’ biopolitics. Against this
background, one respondent added that
As an individual, you have the responsibility to find out how you can provide assistance,
and the authorities are responsible to offer help where it is most needed. Society is lacking
in this regard. I believe there are a rather large number of spontaneous volunteers who are
left outside the crisis management system because it takes a lot of resources and manpower
to manage that kind of inclusion.… In an ideal world, authorities are responsible to
provide citizens with the possibility to be involved in crisis management operations
(Respondent No. 1).
MSB policy documents describe individuals as being responsible for their own security
and for acquiring the capacity to contribute to the prevention and management of
incidents, but they do not acknowledge the continuation of exceptionalism in contem-
porary crisis management which precludes that citizens may demand accountability for
action taken and not taken with regard to security (MSB 2014, 11). These both imply an
underappreciation of the importance of local knowledge and experience for crisis
management and support quite traditional security practices and sovereign practices –
in spite of a progressive discourse about collaboration and participation.
Sweden launched a rescue operation of unprecedented scale during the 2014
Västmanland fire, and the contributions of individuals and NGOs in fact came to be
regarded as invaluable in mitigating the emergency. This prompted official statements
that it was necessary to reevaluate the basic principles of crisis management in Sweden
and promote collaboration (MSB 2016a, 23f). Other reports also pointed to the need to
question authorities’ attitudes toward spontaneous volunteers (Crismart 2016). A 2016
MSB report remarks that previous studies indicated the need to
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focus on civil defense from a holistic perspective that addresses steering, coordination,
management, as well as incentives for private actors to engage in the civil defense planning
(MSB 2016c, 10).
The same report also points to the need for a better understanding of
the behavior and reactions of individuals during accidents and crises, including how
individuals and groups perceive and process information about threats and risks (MSB
2016c,11).
Such statements lend a degree of credence to claims that the MSB’s crisis management
policies are now aimed at reorienting the focus from a purely technocratic under-
standing of individual resources in society toward a more nuanced appreciation of
individual responsibilities, including how different individuals react to emergencies.
Nevertheless, it is evident from the information campaigns that the only way now
possible for individuals to contribute to common security and preparedness is to take
care of themselves (MSB 2017a). This contradiction is rarely taken into consideration,
however. One of the respondents in fact described the overall purpose of the informa-
tion campaigns as communicating the information needed for individuals to decide
whether or not they should undertake preparations for potential crises (Respondent
No. 3). Furthermore, the bulk of information is aimed at increasing the ability of
individuals to prepare for and survive the initial stages of a crisis, not to increase
their overall capabilities during or after an emergency or invoke critical agency and
political concerns, such as indicating how management can be held accountable for
their efforts.
One interviewee noted that
people are actually full of initiative and solidarity and inclined to finding solutions, which
proves that many public actors have the wrong image of people’s capabilities and how they
react (Respondent No. 2).
Furthermore, when the MSB speaks of society’s capabilities, they are referring to their
conception of ‘what should exist and function in society in order to protect important
values’ (MSB 2014, 7). It could thus be argued that ‘capability’ is itself a value that must
be produced in such a way that it makes individual less dependent on public resources
yet at the same time encourages volunteering during crisis to a significantly greater
extent. The MSB has developed 10 future challenges for societal protection and pre-
paredness, such as ‘do not lose the trust of the public’ and ‘the individual’s preparedness
is essential’ (MSB 2014), but these include no mention of how to tackle the lack of
democracy, accountability and transparency that still characterize crisis management
despite a discourse of increased collaboration and participation. This fact clearly
indicates how the concepts of emergency and exceptionalism continue to play a decisive
role in the formation of domestic security management that forfeits a commitment to
reciprocity and meaningful participation.
Moreover, while the term responsibility is of paramount importance in public
information campaigns, the latter mention neither rights nor even duties (Respondent
No. 2). One of our respondents provided a very telling example of the impact this
confusion of concepts has had on how the MSB presents the role of individuals in their
campaigns, observing that
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All of a sudden, the issue of civil defense was to be considered in the planning of the
campaigns, which was not something we had been preparing for…. [A]nd the government
pushed for something akin to wartime readiness [folkförankring], which is a concept that
I’ve never used regarding peacetime crises. All of a sudden we were to “dust off” the
terminology of heightened readiness and war (Respondent No. 2.
Various documents from the government and the MSB often maintain that the key
aspects of society that must be protected include
human faith in democracy and the rule of law; confidence in society’s institutions, political
decision-making, and management capability; and the absence of corruption and the abuse
of justice (MSB 2014, 15).
Such views can be attributed in many respects to the underlying principles of current
crisis management structures and the orientation of security policies toward traditional
objects of interest within the public domain. As a consequence, the traditional concep-
tion of what is most important to protect and preserve is based upon a dated, and
perhaps no longer appropriate, understanding of how threats to the country present
themselves.
We have shown that democratic principles and practices have held little or no place
during, or even after, emergencies and crisis situations – which is to say that the
protection of democratic principles remains undemocratic. This shows the continuation
of Schmittian exceptionalism in modern crisis management and the neoliberal archi-
tecture of participation as ways to unburden public authorities.
Conclusion
The present study has revealed that in spite of a general discourse that seemingly
promotes collaboration involving NGOs, volunteers, and individuals in Swedish crisis
management, such participation is in fact limited to supportive functions intended to
unburden the public authorities in time of crisis. The study thus illustrates how
neoliberal strategies of responsibilization, within a decentralized order of power, are
combined with the logic of exceptionalism, which together foster a continuation of
‘bare life’ biopolitics rather than collaborative governance and participation capable of
underpinning more inclusive forms of crisis management systems. Indeed, the broader
understanding of security that has emerged since the early 1990s is marked by the
extension of exceptionalism to ever more areas of social and political life. This serves to
constrict the space available for democratic participation by the general public despite
the promotion of collaboration and increased participation by the public.
Insofar as we still live in a world in which individuals are viewed as vulnerable
subjects, even though research has revealed that they possess great potential for con-
crete contributions at moments of crisis, the biopolitical management of populations
will continue. What is puzzling is that neoliberal logics of responsibilization merges
with sovereign logics of emergency in modern crisis management that produces a
continuation of state of exception and the temporary annihilation of democratic
institutions and procedures through an ever wider application of fear and individuali-
zation. Whereas Schmitt pointed out the context and features of exceptions (Schmitt
2005, 7), Huysmans suggested that the exception ‘eliminates one of the constituting
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categories of modern democratic politics, hence producing an impoverished and ulti-
mately illusory understanding of the political contestation and domination’ (Huysmans
2008, 165). This is indeed a bleach image of our time as politics of fear is an ever
present form of politics that flourish in austerity, insecurity, and feelings of precarity.
Despite the quite pertinacious mergence of neoliberal and sovereign powers in
contemporary crisis management, we still place our hope for imminent resistance
through critical agency. As responsibilization aspire to activate a specific mind-set,
this in turn may invoke resistance and struggles of meaning-making and indeed a re-
distribution of responsibility. Such resistance is further assisted by new events and
alternative discourses that provide a more complex understanding of the rationalities
underlying the current governance strategies. This article may serve as a critical note in
that regard since it highlight the continuation of exceptionalism, emergency and politics
of fear that guides contemporary crisis management policies.
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